Jerusalem
Issue Brief
Institute for Contemporary
Affairs
founded jointly at the Jerusalem
Center for Public Affairs
with the Wechsler Family
Foundation
Vol. 5, No.
22 6 April 2006
Understanding the Direction of
the New Hamas Government:
Between Tactical Pragmatism and Al-Qaeda
Jihadism
Lt. Col.
(res.) Jonathan D. Halevi
Triumph of the
Muslim Brotherhood
The establishment of
the first Palestinian Islamic government constitutes the culmination of the
“Green Revolution” that Hamas has led in recent years in the Palestinian
Authority. After the elections in Afghanistan and Iraq under the tutelage of the
United States, which seeks to spread democracy to the Muslim world, the Hamas
movement, which is hostile to the United States, succeeded by democratic means
to become a legitimate political force and take power in the Palestinian
Authority. The parliamentary majority that Hamas obtained in the January 2006
elections (74 of 132 parliamentary seats) meant it had a majority to form a
government without the necessity of a coalition with other parliamentary
blocs.
This was the first
time that the Muslim Brotherhood has used the electoral process successfully to
take virtually exclusive control of an Arab regime in the very heart of the Arab
world. (Previously, Hassan Turabi rose to power through the Muslim Brotherhood
in Sudan.) In recent decades, the Muslim Brotherhood had sought to replace
secular regimes in Egypt and Syria, but failed. Despite the surprise expressed
in intelligence circles in Israel, the Middle East, and the West, there were
clear indications that Hamas would take power by democratic means. Over the past
year, the heads of Israeli intelligence pointed to clear and imminent signs that
Hamas was gaining strength and becoming the dominant force in the Palestinian
Authority.
In intelligence
overviews presented to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, both
the head of IDF Military Intelligence, General Aharon Farkash, and the head of
the Israel Security Agency, Yuval Diskin, offered assessments that the
fragmentation and the organizational and ideological crisis in Fatah were
weakening Palestinian chairman Mahmud Abbas, who was not capable of advancing
significant political and security reforms.
According to their
assessments, Hamas was gaining political power in light of its substantial
achievements in four rounds of local authority elections; and Hamas had a huge
advantage over Fatah in light of its extensive organizational infrastructure,
its public image as free of corruption, and the attribution of Israel’s
disengagement from Gaza to the victory of Hamas’ armed
struggle.1
Israeli intelligence
circles view Hamas’ rise as extremely significant, given that it is part of the
worldwide Muslim Brotherhood movement, which works similarly in other countries
(such as Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, and Syria) to establish Islamic rule as the
basis for reviving the caliphate. Indeed, Article Two of the 1988 Hamas Covenant
describes the organization as “one of the way of the Muslim Brotherhood in
Palestine.” The current leader of the international Muslim Brotherhood, Mahdi
‘Akef, admitted openly in an interview to Asharq Alawsat (December 11, 2005) that
the Brotherhood is a global
movement whose members everywhere share a basic, similar religious worldview
(spreading Islam until it takes over the whole
world).
In previous
interviews, ‘Akef has been fiercely anti-American, calling the U.S. “a Satan
that abuses the religion.” He spoke about his belief that the U.S. would be
eliminated: “I expect America to collapse soon,” asserting: “I have complete
faith that Islam will invade Europe and America.”2 While sometimes
U.S. observers view the Muslim Brotherhood (and even Hamas) as a more moderate
alternative to al-Qaeda for Islamists, the Brotherhood has a history of actively
supporting global jihadi efforts.
Prior to the U.S.-led attack on the Taliban regime, the Muslim Brotherhood
actually had training camps in Afghanistan where it worked with Kashmiri
militants and sought to expand its influence in Central Asian states, especially
Tajikistan.3
This commitment to
militant activism continues and is being reinforced.In his December 2005
interview, ‘Akef added: “The entire Muslim Brotherhood in the global arena acts
according to a written platform4 (in which jihad is the way to attain our ends)....We
have the largest organization in the world. A (Muslim) person who is in the
global arena and believes in the Muslim Brotherhood’s path is considered part of
us and we are part of him.”5 Not surprisingly, then, the Muslim
Brotherhood did not portray Hamas’ triumph as a local victory but rather as “a
victory of the Islamic nation in its entirety.”6 From the Brotherhood’s
perspective, Hamas members are expected to serve its global agenda and not just
their local interests alone. In a recent weekly missive ‘Akef declared a new
strategy adopted by the Brotherhood to confront Western imperialism and the
satanic alliance between the U.S. and Israel based on supporting the
“resistance” in any Muslim country under foreign occupation, including
Palestine, Iraq, and Afghanistan. For the first time, ‘Akef called upon the
Brotherhood to grant not only financial and material support but to join the
resistance to achieve freedom for the Muslim nation.7
The Hamas leadership
as well shares this view of the overall struggle between the Islamist movement
and the West. In August 2005, Mahmud al-Zahar, today the new Hamas foreign
minister, expressed the hope that Hamas’ victory against Israel, as expressed by
the Gaza disengagement, would empower the mujahideen in Iraq and Afghanistan. More
recently, Khaled Mashaal, who heads the Hamas political bureau abroad, declared
in a Damascus mosque in early February 2006: “We say to this West, which does
not act reasonable, and does not learn its lessons: by Allah, you will be
defeated.”8 Mashaal added: “Tomorrow, our nation will sit on the
throne of the world.” In Sudan, he lashed out at the West for helping the
Christian population of East Timor and for opposing Khartoum’s operations
against the population of Darfur, which the U.S. has categorized as
genocide.9 Thus, Hamas does not confine itself to the Palestinian
issue alone. It truly sees itself as the vanguard of a global
movement.
Yet, from Hamas’
standpoint, the paramount strategic goal in the short term is to establish its new rule
and attain Arab and international legitimacy for its existence based on the
Islamic principles of the Hamas platform. Despite its overwhelming victory in
the parliamentary elections, Hamas seeks to win international recognition by
creating an image of political pragmatism and of readiness to join the
international community as a constructive force.
The Limits of
Hamas’ Tactical Flexibility
As a first step in
the direction of pragmatism, Hamas proclaimed after the January elections its
great interest in setting up as broad a coalition as possible that would include
the rival Fatah movement as a senior partner. In the coalition negotiations,
which ultimately failed, Hamas showed readiness to make considerable concessions
toward Fatah’s position, but without deviating from its own basic principles.
During the course of the coalition negotiations, the guidelines of the Hamas
government headed by Ismail Haniyeh were changed three times, to the limits of
Hamas’ political flexibility, in an attempt to answer the demands of the
international community. Hamas made use of certain themes in the political
terminology of the Palestinian Authority and Fatah to present guidelines
characterized by constructive ambiguity and vagueness. These included:
This seemingly
pragmatic line meshes with the diplomatic and media offensive (aimed also at the
American media) that Hamas has waged since the elections. Hamas leader Khaled
Mashaal speaks of a readiness to achieve “real peace” and of implicit
recognition of the Arab peace initiative that was approved at the Beirut summit
in March 2002.
The new Hamas prime
minister, Ismail Haniyeh, has presented toned-down messages regarding the
resolution of the conflict. In his words, Hamas “is not hostile to the Jews,”
adding that Hamas “is not interested in throwing them into the sea.” Hamas did
not want “blood(shed),” and “has no interest in a vicious cycle of
violence.”12
In an interview with CBS News, Haniyeh stressed that
he had never sent anyone to carry out a suicide bombing and that even if one of
his sons were to ask his permission to perpetrate one, he would not consider
granting it.13
In an article for
the British Guardian entitled “A
Just Peace or No Peace,” Haniyeh stated: “We in Hamas are for peace and want to
put an end to bloodshed...and offer our hands in peace” based on complete
withdrawal from the territories and Israeli absorption of millions of
Palestinians into Israel.14
Hamas’
Uncompromising Strategic Goals
Clearly, neither the
formulation of the Hamas government’s guidelines nor its diplomatic charm
offensive indicates any breakthrough or strategic shift in Hamas policy. The
changes are solely semantic, aimed primarily at legitimizing Hamas politically.
Hamas remains committed to its basic principles, from which it has not deviated.
These include:
Hamas’ rise to power has not moderated its uncompromising attitude regarding a final resolution of the conflict. Hamas views itself as occupying a position of power that enables it to impose its demands on Israel that actually entail Israel’s destruction ? first and foremost, the absorption of millions of Palestinian refugees.
In Hamas’
perception, history is playing into the hands of an Islamic movement that is
constantly gaining strength vis-a-vis Israel, which, despite its greater
military power, is weak in spirit and unable to cope in the long term with the
determination of Hamas and the Palestinian people to regain their “full
historical rights.”
Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal repeatedly expresses this outlook, which was reinforced by Israel’s unilateral disengagement from Gaza and northern Samaria. In an interview with NEW TV in Lebanon, Mashaal noted that “the Israeli disengagement plan was carried out because the leadership reached a crisis in its policy...since it cannot defeat the Palestinians and break their will.”
Hamas’ victory,
according to Mashaal, is a “message of the Palestinian people to Israel that the
Palestinian people will not be broken and will not be defeated; on the contrary,
it has chosen a leadership it believes in that will lead it to victory,
liberation, and the regaining of rights.” In Mashaal’s view, “the Hamas
movement, the leadership along with the Palestinian people, believe with full
faith that they will not be broken and will not submit to the terms of Israel
and the United States but rather will impose their own terms.” Mashaal
emphasized that Israel “is not capable of withstanding a protracted struggle,”
whereas Hamas, the Palestinian people, and the Arab nation do possess the
ability to wage such a struggle.17
To this end,
the Hamas movement continues to maintain its military wing, the Iz a-Din
al-Kassam Brigades, as an independent organization that will not submit to the
Palestinian establishment nor be assimilated into a national Palestinian army.
A senior leader of the Hamas military wing, identified as Abu Huzaifa, said
in an interview with Alwatanvoice.com from Gaza that since the disengagement,
Hamas has set up training bases in all the Palestinian towns for training new
cadres of jihad warriors.
At these bases, initial regular training lasts over a month and advanced training takes three months. It includes combat skills, physical fitness, rifle practice, firing rockets, warfare tactics, crawling under fences, and climbing and descending from buildings.
The instructors are Hamas operatives who were trained abroad. According to Abu Huzaifa, Hamas units for military production are working diligently on developing new and advanced weapons including rockets and explosives.
Hamas is
also working hard to turn the al-Kassam Brigades into a standing army under
Hamas command “until the total liberation of all Palestinian land.”18
Even though Hamas has refrained from carrying out terror attacks since fall 2005 (as Israeli intelligence sources attest), it continues to view “resistance,” a Palestinian codeword for armed struggle in its various forms, as the only means to remove Israel from the entire territory of Palestine.
Hamas Interior Minister Said Sayyam, who is responsible for the Palestinian security forces, has outlined the Hamas government’s policy regarding terror. Sayyam, who supports suicide bombings against civilians,19 announced on March 24, 2006, that he does not intend to maintain any security coordination or cooperation with Israel, and publicly committed himself not to order arrests of operatives who carry out terror attacks. Hamas, he suggests, will seek to coordinate the military activity against Israel.20
His early appointment of a
prominent Aqsa Brigades (Fatah) commander as his ministry’s spokesperson implies
his future intentions.21
Hamas and Al-Qaeda: Partners in
Global Jihad
On March 2, 2006, PA Chairman Abbas told Al-Hayat (UK) that he had received intelligence information indicating the presence of al-Qaeda operatives in the West Bank and Gaza,22 just two days after Israel publicized the arrest of two al-Qaeda operatives in Nablus.
Azzam Abu al-Ads and Bilal Hafnawy were indicted
for recruiting operatives to carry out terror attacks for al-Qaeda and planning
a combined terror attack in Jerusalem with a suicide bomber and a car bomb.
Members of the gang who were recruited by al-Qaeda’s infrastructure in Irbid,
Jordan, were arrested by Israeli security forces at the Allenby Bridge on
December 10, 2005, when returning from Jordan.23
However, on
March 15, 2006, Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal called Abbas’ warning about an
al-Qaeda infrastructure in the PA “unfortunate,” adding that “we don’t
understand the logic behind these statements.”
He emphasized that “al-Qaeda
has no presence on Palestinian soil.”24
Yet on April 4,
2006, Al-Hayat reported “a
definite presence” of al-Qaeda operatives in the Gaza Strip who had just
infiltrated from several Arab countries including Egypt, Sudan, and
Yemen.
It has been known for some time that al-Qaeda operatives are present in the Palestinian Authority. In August 2000, Israel’s security service uncovered a terror network linked to al-Qaeda and headed by Nabil Okal, a Hamas operative from Gaza, who underwent military training in camps of the terrorist chieftain Osama bin Laden in Pakistan and Afghanistan during 1997-1998.25
In July 2005,
al-Qaeda gangs fired Kassam rockets at the Israeli town of Neve Dekalim in Gush
Katif and also disseminated a video documenting its activities.26 On October 7, 2005, the
Palestinian news agency Ma’an published a declaration circulated in Khan Yunis
in which al-Qaeda announced the establishment of a branch in Gaza. The
declaration, signed with the name “Qaedat Aljihad in Palestine,” states that the
organization’s main goals are: implementing Islamic law (Sharia), setting up a Sharia state, reviving the idea of the
caliphate in the hearts of the Muslims, and working to create a worldwide
Islamic caliphate.27
More recently on March 26, 2006, a senior Hamas figure, Muhammad Sayyam, met in Peshawar, Pakistan, with Sayyid Salah al-Din, leader of the Kashmiri terror organization Hezb ul-Mujahidin,28 which had training camps in Afghanistan until the Taliban’s rise to power and functioned as an al-Qaeda affiliate.29
Sayyam heads the Yemeni branch of the Palestine
Scholars Association, which advocates uncompromising jihad against the infidels and legally
sanctioned suicide bombings against civilians in Israel. He sees the role of
Muslim religious sages as spiritual guides whose task is to motivate the masses
to struggle against Islam’s enemies and attack them with suicide
bombings.30
In honor of a visit
to Yemen by Khaled Mashaal on March 20, 2006, the Hamas office in Yemen
organized a conference to recruit financial aid for the Hamas movement and the
new Hamas government. Sheikh Abd al-Majid al-Zindani also took part in the
conference, meeting with Mashaal, calling on participants to assist the Hamas
regime, and setting a personal example by contributing 200,000
rials.31 Zindani stressed that “the support we can provide at present is money (emphasis added),” hinting at
other forms of support for Hamas in the future.
On February 24,
2004, U.S. authorities had designated al-Zindani as a terror supporter, “loyal
to Osama bin Laden and a supporter of the al-Qaeda organization.” The U.S.
Treasury Department stated: “The U.S. has credible evidence that al-Zindani, a
Yemeni national, supports designated terrorists and terrorist organizations” and
“has a long history of working with bin Laden, notably serving as one of his
spiritual leaders.”
The statement said al-Zindani “support[ed] many
terrorist causes, including actively recruiting for al-Qaeda training camps,”
and in 2004 “played a key role in the purchase of weapons on behalf of al-Qaeda
and other terrorists.”32
Relations between al-Qaeda and Hamas go back to the early 1990s. In April 1991, Sudanese leader Hasan Turabi hosted a “Popular Arab and Islamic Conference” in Khartoum that brought together for the first time Islamists from the Middle East, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. In addition to Hamas, Osama bin Laden also attended and in subsequent years turned Sudan into his main base of operations.
Turabi continued to
host this jihadist gathering in
1993 and 1995; Hamas training camps in Sudan existed alongside those of
al-Qaeda. Their solidarity could be inferred from bin Laden’s explicit reference
to Hamas founder Sheikh Ahmad Yassin as one of the five ulema on which bin Laden based his August
1996 Declaration of Jihad Against
the U.S.33
As noted in the case
of al-Zindani, al-Qaeda and Hamas have long shared global funding mechanisms. On
October 22, 2003, Richard A. Clarke, the former National Counterterrorism
Coordinator on the U.S. National Security Council, acknowledged that Hamas and
al-Qaeda had a common financial infrastructure: “the funding mechanisms for PIJ
[Palestinian Islamic Jihad] and Hamas appear also to have been funding
al-Qaeda.”34
Even though Hamas and al-Qaeda share a similar worldview that seeks to impose worldwide Islamic rule, recently disagreements have erupted between the two organizations over how to implement the Islamic revolution.
In a taped missive
on March 5, 2006, Ayman al-Zawahiri, bin Laden’s deputy, called on Hamas to
continue its armed struggle and reject agreements signed between Israel and the
Palestinian Authority. Al-Zawahiri emphasized that “no Palestinian has the right
to give up even a grain of Palestinian land,” and warned Hamas against “the new
American game that is called a political process,” alluding to democratization.
Khaled Mashaal responded by saying that Hamas did not need advice from al-Qaeda,
and will continue to act in keeping with its worldview and the Palestinian
interest.35
Mashaal’s reaction indicates a difference between Hamas’ agenda and al-Qaeda’s. Al-Qaeda totally rejects any element of Western influence and sees terror as the most effective means to overthrow the infidel regimes, spread Islam, and establish Islamic rule. Hamas, however, is prepared to make a pretense of going along with the Western democratic rules of the game and thereby exploit them to remove the infidel regimes, propagate Islam, and install Islamic rule that will eliminate democracy.
Yet, in
substance, Hamas has not rejected the heart of al-Zawahiri’s advice: it still
refuses to give up armed struggle or recognize past Israeli-Palestinian
agreements, and it steadfastly refuses to state that it is prepared to make
peace with Israel. In other words, Hamas is prepared to adopt a pragmatic tactic
that does not violate its basic principles as a means of realizing its ultimate
long-term goals, which are no different from al-Qaeda’s.
Hamas’ Short-Term Policy
Khaled
Mashaal said in Yemen on March 20, 2006, that “Hamas is capable of making a
distinction between the [current] stage [of Hamas’ strategy] and political
tactics.” In this context, Mashaal outlined the Hamas government’s goals in the
coming period by order of priority:
An interim
assessment of Hamas points to initial achievements in this plan of action. They
are as follows:
Hamas is working carefully to
gradually accustom the public to the change in the nature of the government. The
new Hamas chairman of the parliament, Abd al-Aziz Dweik, claimed in an interview
to the foreign media that “no one in the Hamas movement has any intention to
implement Sharia by force...but
rather by persuasion and preaching in a good
spirit.”38
The Hamas delegation also visited
Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Bahrain, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Kuwait,
and Saudi Arabia. Hamas received generous promises of assistance to the new
Islamic government in light of the reduction and stoppage of aid from Western
countries. Al-Hayat reported on
February 28, 2006, that Teheran promised Hamas aid totaling $250 million as
compensation for the Western boycott. Saudi Arabia also promised assistance to
the Palestinian Authority, but demanded that Hamas accept the Arab peace
initiative and, implicitly, that it sever itself from Iranian influence, which
arouses great concern in the Arab
world.40
In the Arab arena, the Arab
Summit that convened in Sudan at the end of March committed itself to assist the
Hamas government politically and economically. The chairman of the Arab League
is trying to open a political path for Hamas by urging that Hamas’ implicit
agreement to the Arab peace initiative would exempt it from the Israeli and
American demand to explicitly recognize Israel’s right to exist.41 On
the eve of the summit, Khaled Mashaal called on the leaders of the Arab states
to support the Palestinian Authority under Hamas’ leadership with a sum of $170
million per month that would enable it to run the affairs of the Authority and
pay salaries.42
Hamas and the
PLO
In the internal arena, Hamas succeeded in undermining the PLO’s status as the sole representative of the Palestinian people and in gravely damaging its authority to make decisions that obligate the entire Palestinian people. Hamas completely rejected the demands of Abbas and the PLO Executive Committee to alter the guidelines of its government, accept the PLO’s (1988) Resolution of Independence, and indicate that the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians.
Hamas presented its
government’s guidelines to the parliament in blatant defiance of the PLO and its
status as the supreme source of authority for the Palestinian
Authority.43
The clash over this issue led Palestinian figures, including members of the Palestinian National Council, to declare that the PLO in its present composition no longer represents the Palestinian people, given the stagnation that occurred over the past decade and the PLO’s decisions to change its national charter and approve the agreements with Israel.
This meshes with
Hamas’ demand to carry out comprehensive reforms in the PLO, particularly
holding democratic elections in the Palestinian diaspora for PLO institutions in
order to enhance the refugees’ role in the future struggle to realize the “right
of return.”44
The Impact of
the Hamas Victory on Jordan
The relations
between Hamas and Jordan’s Hashemite regime are more complicated, despite
Jordan’s official support for the new Islamic government. On March 22, 2006,
Jordan publicly warned Hamas not to interfere in the kingdom’s internal affairs
through its connections with the Islamic Action Front Party, which is a front
party for Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood movement. This warning was publicized
after Zacki Bani Irshid was elected as general secretary of the Islamic Action
Front. Irshid is considered the figure closest to Hamas.45
Indeed, Hamas’ overwhelming victory in the elections for the Palestinian parliament had caused shock waves in Jordan. Dr. Azaam al-Huneidi, head of the Islamic Action Front faction in the Jordanian Parliament, praised Hamas’ achievement and saw it as an important signpost and model for the Islamic takeover of Arab regimes.
Al-Huneidi regards
Hamas’ victory as holding great significance for the awakening of Islam in the
Arab world. The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan seeks to influence decision-making
in the national arena, and is prepared, according to al-Huneidi, to take the
reins of executive authority (i.e., government) ? in a way similar to Hamas. He
expressed confidence that if elections were to be held in Jordan according to a
fair election law, the Muslim Brotherhood would easily take power in a
democratic process.
Al-Huneidi called upon the Jordanian government to implement the democratic rules of the game, and to refrain from trying to hinder the progress of the Muslim Brotherhood. He warned the government that the Jordanian people and the Muslim Brotherhood, whose popularity and political power is constantly growing, “will not be quiet for long” in the face of continued neglect and contempt for the will of the people and the absence of genuine democratic reform.46
Emboldened
by the Hamas victory, politicians in the Islamic Action Front have begun to
break the “gentlemen’s rules” of Jordanian politics, according to which
opposition parties do not directly criticize the Hashemite
monarchy.47 Jordan’s growing Islamist movement is convinced that the
same democratic process used by the Palestinians would lead to an Islamic
Republic in Jordan, as
well.48
Implications
for the Future
Hamas has reaped the
fruits of the “Green Revolution” that it led in recent years to win many local
authority elections, obtain a stable majority in the Palestinian parliament, and
take decisive control of executive authority. Hamas’ tactical agreement to play
by the democratic rules was a Trojan horse that enabled the movement to
participate in the elections as a legitimate political force. It exploited the
fragmentation of Fatah and the weakness of the Palestinian Authority to achieve
political dominance as a first stage toward establishing Islamic rule that will
implement Sharia law and lead, in
fact, to the eradication of democracy.
Its landslide victory in the elections has not blinded the Hamas leadership, which is aware of the momentous challenges it faces in transforming itself from an extragovernmental movement into the dominant governing party. This is not just an intra-Palestinian challenge. Hamas views its political mission from a broad Islamic perspective as the vanguard of the worldwide Islamic revolution led by its parent-movement, the Muslim Brotherhood.
Hamas’ rise
to power has inspired Islamic movements all over the world and motivated them to
emulate Hamas’ approach (tactical participation in a democratic
process) in order to win similar successes in their own countries. The key
factor is to activate the masses as an organized force to translate their power
into decisive political influence in democratic elections, or as a means to
impose an Islamic revolution.
The Muslim Brotherhood, which has a loyal and dedicated organizational infrastructure throughout the world, has found in Hamas’ important political and psychological achievement a convenient basis for a frontal offensive against the West.
The leader
of the Brotherhood recently declared for the first time a significant change in
strategy for the struggle against the West and Christianity ?
primarily, a shift from extending economic and material assistance to Islamic
organizations that fight in arenas of struggle against the West (Palestine,
Iraq, Afghanistan) to actual participation in the struggle.
From now on, the duty to take part in jihad on the battlefield does not fall only on local Muslims but rather on all Muslims everywhere.
This means that
Muslim Brotherhood activists in Islamic centers in Europe and North America are
also called upon to contribute to the campaign against the West, to continue
financial assistance to the Islamic organizations fighting the United States and
its allies, and to dispatch fighters to the arenas of battle.
The Muslim
Brotherhood’s transition to a frontal battle poses a complex intelligence
challenge to Western democracies that requires increased surveillance both of
radical Islamic actors suspected of involvement in terror, and of money
transfers from the West to organizations that are linked to the Muslim
Brotherhood and active in the arenas of battle.
Hamas’ attempt to create an impression of political pragmatism is primarily aimed at helping it gain international legitimacy for Islamic government according to Muslim Brotherhood doctrine.
Hamas has no intention of reaching a settlement with Israel based on mutual recognition; instead it seeks to mobilize the international community to support Palestinian positions based on the principle of “historical justice” including the “restoration” of Palestinian rights, which mainly means the absorption of millions of Palestinian refugees into the State of Israel, which will then inevitably cease to be a Jewish state.
In Hamas’ view, this
is not the time for concessions. An unconditional Israeli withdrawal to the ‘67
borders as Hamas demands is seen as serving the Palestinian interest and putting
Israel in a position of strategic inferiority that increases the threat to its
existence.
The Palestinian Authority under Hamas rule is becoming a safe haven for Islamic terror organizations, first and foremost al-Qaeda. Hamas’ declared policy of granting immunity to all Palestinian and Islamic terror organizations actually constitutes an open invitation to terrorists of all stripes to acquire a refuge and convenient base for activity.
Hamas’ ideological
closeness to al-Qaeda and its branches throughout the world (including Yemen and
Pakistan) also creates a basis for practical cooperation, including sharing of
knowledge, as well as in joint training, financial assistance, recruitment of
operatives, and terror attacks.
In the Israeli context, the threat is now many times greater because of its proximity to the urban population concentrations in the center of the country and to strategic targets (power plants, airports).
Hamas’ temporary
restraint is only a truce that helps it improve its equipment and deployment for
the next round of military confrontation. Meanwhile, Hamas is giving other
Palestinian terror organizations a free hand to perpetrate attacks against
Israel, whose scope has returned to the level that existed before the unilateral
disengagement from the Gaza Strip and northern Samaria.
Hamas regards the PLO as the next target for political takeover. Hamas demands comprehensive reforms in the PLO, focusing particularly on nullifying the resolutions on a settlement with Israel and on elections for the organization’s institutions in the Palestinian diaspora.
Hamas policy
reflects the assumption that its chances of obtaining a decisive majority in
elections in diaspora refugee camps are very high, which would thereby enable
Hamas to take exclusive responsibility for representing the entire Palestinian
people and to appropriate the Palestinians’ historical achievements in the
international arena (observer status in the United Nations, membership in
international organizations, assets, etc.).
Moreover, the transfer of the Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan to Hamas control would give the movement great political power vis-a-vis the Jordanian regime and a key to the stability of the Hashemite kingdom. The link-up between the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan (with whom many Palestinians in the kingdom identify) and a Hamas-led Palestinian state could throw Jordan into a phase of instability and threaten the continued existence of the royal house.
Unlike the
Hashemite kingdom, which has not succeeded in creating a Jordanian identity that
unites Jordanians and Palestinians, the Muslim Brotherhood offers an outlook
that could unite Muslims under the flag of Islam without regard to ethnic
origin.
* *
*
Notes
1.
http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3132851,00.html
http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3118141,00.html;
http://www.knesset.gov.il/AllSite/mark02/h0208835.htm#TQL;
http://www.knesset.gov.il/AllSite/mark02/h0208846.htm#TQL;
http://www.knesset.gov.il/AllSite/mark02/h0208861.htm#1;
http://www.knesset.gov.il/AllSite/mark02/h0208864.htm#21;
Ha’aretz, January 3, 2006, http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/spages/665761.html;
http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART1/040/491.html
2. “New Muslim Brotherhood Leaders:
Resistance in Iraq and Palestine is Legitimate; America is Satan; Islam Will
Invade America and Europe,” MEMRI Special
Dispatch Series, No. 655, February 4, 2004, http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP65504
3. See British Intelligence document in Roland Jacquard, In the Name of Osama Bin Laden (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), pp. 263-267.
4. For the platform of the Muslim
Brotherhood, see
http://www.ikhwanonline.com/Procedure.asp
5. Asharq Alawsat (London), December 11,
2005.
6. http://www.ikhwanonline.com/Article.asp?ID=17600&SectionID=104
7. http://www.ikhwanonline.com/Article.asp?ID=19139&LevelID=1&SectionID=213
8. “Hamas Leader Khaled Mash’al at a
Damascus Mosque: The Nation of Islam Will Sit at the Throne of the World and the
West Will Be Full of Remorse ? When It’s Too Late,” MEMRI Special Dispatch Series, No. 1087,
February 7, 2006; http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=subjects&Area=jihad&ID=SP108706
9. “Hamas Political
Leader Khaled Mash’al Listens to Poetry in Sudan and Declares: There Is No Other
Way than Sacrificing Our Property and Our Souls,” MEMRI TV Monitor Project, February 14,
2006, http://memritv.org/Transcript.asp?P1=1044
10. http://www.palestine-info.info/arabic/hamas/hewar/2006/khalid_meshel/khalid_ahraam.htm
11. http://www.palestine-info.info/arabic/palestoday/reports/report2006_1/16_3_06.htm
12. http://www.islamonline.net/English/News/2006-02/26/article03.shtml,
February
26, 2006.
13. “Hamas Leader Talks Peace,” CBS Evening News, March 16, 2006,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/03/16/eveningnews/main1414076.shtml?CMP=ILC-SearchStories
14. http://www.guardian.co.uk/israel/Story/0,,1743652,00.html
15. “The Hamas Charter (1988),”
Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies,
http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/hamas_charter.pdf
16. http://www.pal-election.com/pages/deen/tash.htm
17. http://www.palestine-info.info/arabic/hamas/hewar/2006/khalid_meshel/meshel_new_tv_19_3_06.htm
18. http://www.alwatanvoice.com/articles.php?go=articles&id=38771
19. http://www.ikhwanonline.com/Article.asp?ID=5401&SectionID=342
20. http://www.islamonline.net/Arabic/news/2006-03/24/article02.shtml
21. http://www.maannews.net/ar/do.php?name=News&file=article&sid=23869
22. Al-Hayat (London), March 2,
2006, http://www.daralhayat.com/special/03-2006/Item-20060301-b7a0a128-c0a8-10ed-001e-064cf07d77ed/story.html
23. http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3230691,00.html
24. http://www.palestine-info.info/arabic/hamas/hewar/2006/khalid_meshel/meshel_new_tv_19_3_06.htm